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RAY V. ALEXANDRIA MALL:
AMENDING THE PETITION TO NAME
A NEW DEFENDANT
On February 18, 1981, Frances Ray slipped and fell in the Alexandria
Mall. She filed a damages suit on February 4, 1982, naming Alexandria
Mall as defendant. The sheriff served process on the mall general man-
ager at her mall office. On March 12, 1982, Ray amended her suit to
name the Alexandria Mall Company, a partnership, as the defendant
because the original suit had named a non-existent legal entity. The
defendant filed a peremptory exception of prescription. The trial court
sustained this exception, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the amended pe-
tition naming the proper defendant related back to the time of the filing
of the original petition. Ray v. Alexandria Mall.'
Prescription is premised on three policies: to protect the defendant
from stale evidence, to free the defendant from the fear of litigation
after a certain point in time, and to promote efficient judicial admin-
istration by eliminating unnecessarily stale claims and manufactured facts
from the courtroom.2 For prescription to be interrupted, Louisiana
Civil Code article 3462 requires the filing of a suit against the defendant,
within the prescriptive period, in a court of competent jurisdiction and
venue. The article assumes that the defendant will receive notice of the
formal claim within a reasonable time through service of process. If
the plaintiff has not filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue,
it is essential that the defendant be served, because service of process
is the legal act which interrupts the running of prescription in that
situation.3
Problems arise when the plaintiff files in a court of competent
jurisdiction and venue but names the wrong defendant in the suit. Article
1153 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[wihen
the action . . . asserted in the amended petition . .. arises out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of filing of the original pleading." Although the defendant is incorrectly
named in the petition, the amended complaint will relate back if the
proper defendant has in fact been served with process. This relation
back is allowed because the proper defendant receives the same notice
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
2. Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 211, 233 (1969).
3. Conner v. Continental S. Lines, Inc., 294 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. 1974).
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of the claim that he would have received had he been correctly named
in the initial petition.
The easy case to which article 1153 applies arises when the plaintiff
names the defendant incorrectly but serves process on the agent appointed
by the defendant to receive process. Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc.,4
a case decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court, involves such a factual
situation. The plaintiff named Evan-Hall Sugar Cooperative in the orig-
inal petition, instead of the proper defendant, Triangle Farms. However,
the same person served as general manager for both corporations, and
both corporations had appointed the general manager as agent for service
of process. The plaintiff perfected service of process on the general
manager. The court held that the amended petition naming Triangle
Farms as defendant related back to the original filing because Triangle
Farms had notice of the formal claim through service of process on its
appointed agent.
The Louisiana courts also allow an amended complaint to relate
back where the plaintiff names the wrong defendant but serves an officer
or director of the corporation with process. In Andrepont v. Ochsner'
the court of appeal held that service of process on the president of the
corporation is sufficient notice to the corporation; therefore, the amended
complaint related back. The plaintiff named Dr. Alton Ochsner indi-
vidually in a malpractice suit, and Dr. Ochsner received service of
process. The plaintiff amended his complaint to name the Ochsner
Medical Foundation as defendant. As president of the Ochsner Medical
Foundation, Dr. Ochsner was an agent of the hospital; therefore, the
Foundation had timely notice of the claim by service upon its president.
6
Louisiana courts do not, however, allow the amended petition to
relate back where the plaintiff names the wrong defendant and serves
the wrong defendant. In Majesty v. Comet-Mercury-Ford Co.7 the su-
preme court sustained the defendant's peremptory exception of prescrip-
tion and refused to allow the amended complaint to relate back to the
original filing. In the petition, the plaintiff named a fictitious entity
with a fictitious address. The plaintiff attempted to serve process through
the Secretary of State on the grounds that the named entity was not
qualified to do business in Louisiana and no agent had been designated
for service of process. Five months after the statute of limitations had
expired, the Secretary of State mailed a copy of the petition to an
4. 208 La. 538, 23 So. 2d 209 (1945).
5. 84 So. 2d 63 (La. App. Orl. 1955).
6. See McClendon v. Security Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976),
disapproved, Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983); and Melancon v.
Lorde, 435 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) where the courts held that knowledge
to the corporation does not impart knowledge to the president.
7. 296 So. 2d 271 (La. 1974), rev'd, Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083 (La.
1983).
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assembly plant operated by the proper defendant, Ford Motor Company.
Ford had in fact qualified .to do business in Louisiana and had designated
an agent for service of process, the C T. Corporation. In refusing to
allow the petition to relate back, the court stated that "it is now
understood in -the law that an amending :petition to correct a misnomer
does not relate back to the filing of the original petition." '8 Many
Louisiana courts -cite this language when -refusing to allow an amended
petition to relate back to the original .filing date. It should be noted,
however., -that Majesty was not a -misnomer case. The plaintiff named
the wrong defendant, -and 'the plaintiff never served the defendant's
designated agent with process. Therefore, Ford never received the req-
uisite notice of the formal claim. If a suit 'is not filed in .a court 'of
competent jurisdiction and venue, Louisiana s statutory scheme requires
that the proper person, as designated by law, be served before service
of process will interrupt the -running of prescription. 9
A case factually similar to Majesty is a first circuit court of appeal
decision, Small v. Caterpillar Manufacturing Corp. " The plaintiff named
Caterpillar 'Manufacturing in the petition and attempted to serve that defen-
dant through 'the Secretry of 'State. The correct defendant was a .foreign
.corporation, Caterpillar Tractor, Which'had designated C.T. Corporation
as its agent :for -service.of.process. Louisiana allows timely service of pro-
cess to be effected after'the statute of limitations has expired. The :.amended
petition relates back to -the original filing if the defendant :is served with
process Within a reasonable time after the filing. However, the Small court
.held thatCaterpillar Tractor Company "had no actual notice of the suit
within the prescriptive period since -suit was notinstituted until the last day
of -the prescriptive period and service on the Secretary of State made
several days "thereafter.-"" Although the court :reversed and remanded
the suit to determine whether prescription was interrupted becauseof a
solidary relationship between Caterpillar -and other defendants -named in
the -suit, -the court cited Majesty and -its :miEnomer language in ruling
'that the suit was not 'interrupted -in 'the absence of solidary liability.
Small is factually similar 'to Majesty 'in that both involved a cor-
poration qualified to do business in Louisiana which had -appointed
an agent for service of process. In both icases the plaintiff attempted
-to serve the .defendant through the Secretary -of -State instead of through
the -designated agent. -Additionally, in Small, .as in Majesty, the plaintiff
never properly served -the proper defendant's designated -agent. The first
.circuit could simply have followed Majesty without resort to the "no
8. Id at 273.
,9. -294 So. 2d at 488.
10. _319 So. 2d 843 (La. App. .1st Cir. 1975), disapproved, Ray-v. Alexandria Mall,
.434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
11. Id at 845.
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actual notice within the prescriptive period" language which it used
because no valid service of process was made to interrupt prescription.
The Louisiana courts also hold that although a plaintiff names the
wrong defendant in a petition, prescription is interrupted by service of
process on the defendant's domicile. In Brooks v. Wiltz 2 the plaintiff
incorrectly named Elsworth G. Wiltz in the petition. The defendant who
should have been named was Ellis G. Wiltz, the twin brother of Elsworth
A. Both boys were attending college; therefore, the plaintiff served the
twins' mother with process at her residence. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal deemed service on the domicile to be sufficient to interrupt
prescription against Ellis, and the amended complaint related back. By
serving the domicile of the mother, the plaintiff, in effect, notified both
brothers of the suit; thus, service of process was effective as to both.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal rendered a similar decision in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manemin.' The son, D. C. Manemin, was the
tortfeasor, but the plaintiff incorrectly named in the petition the father,
C. D. Manemin, as the defendant. The court ruled that the amended
petition related back to the original filing because the plaintiff had
perfected service of process on the father's home where the son also
had his domicile. The son thus had notice of the plaintiff's suit through
service of process on his domicile.
The Louisiana statutory scheme requires the filing of a suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction and venue to interrupt prescription.
However, if the plaintiff's suit is defective, that is, if the plaintiff files
in a court of incompetent jurisdiction and venue or names the wrong
defendant, prescription is still interrupted if process has been served on
the proper defendant. The legal act of service of process interrupts
prescription, and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 allows
an amended complaint to relate back to the original filing.
The source of article 1153 is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). 14
Rule 15(c) was amended in 1966 "to state more clearly when an amend-
ment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
(including an amendment to correct a misnomer or a misdescription of
a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading."'"
The last sentence of Rule 15(c) states:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and,
within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the action that he will
12. 144 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
13. 280 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
14. Projet, La. Code Civ. P. art. 1153 & comments (1959).
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amendment.
39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
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not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake con-
cerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him.
Although article 1153 was enacted before the amendment to Rule 15(c)
and, therefore, does not include this last sentence, federal jurisprudence
interpreting the rule, before and after its amendment, serves as persuasive
authority for interpreting article 1153.
Federal decisions both before and after the amendment to Rule 15(c)
have allowed the relation back where process was served on an agent
of the corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship which the plaintiff
had attempted to name. In a pre-amendment case decided by the U.
S. District Court in Delaware, Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R.,16 the
plaintiff named E. J. Lavino & Company in the petition as the defendant
instead of the proper party, Lavino Shipping Company. Both of the
corporations had the same resident agent, the same president and di-
rectors, and the same principal place of business. The appointed agent
for Lavino Shipping Company received service of process; therefore, the
court allowed the amended petition to relate back.
In another pre-amendment case, Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo,'7 a
farm employee named three individuals and a corporation as defendants
in his suit for damages. The farm was actually operated as a partnership.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the amendment related
back because "those who had the liability had notice of the suit. '"'8
The three individuals who were named and served with process were
partners in the partnership. In attempting to discern whether relation
back should be allowed, the court noted:
The test should be whether on the basis of an objective standard,
it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a
particular entity or person, merely made a mistake as to the
name, and actually served the entity or person intended, or did
the plaintiff actually mean to serve and sue a different person."
The farm employee intended to sue the partnership, made a mistake in
the name, but actually served an agent of the intended partnership. This
is so because a partner is an agent of the partnership for service of pro-
cess.2"
In a post-amendment case, Lockett v. General Finance Loan Co.,2 the
Fifth Circuit cited Taormina Corp. in finding that the amended petition
16. 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950).
17. 1254 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958).
18. Id. at 173.
19. Id.
20. Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 9 (1914).
21. 623 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980).
19851
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related back to the original filing. The plaintiff had named the subsidiary
instead of the parent company in the petition and had served the
,subsidiary with process. The court stated facts indicating the parent
company ;had knowledge of the suit: the parent made a -general ap-
pearance, and every officer and director -of the parent served as ,an
officer and director of the subsidiary. Therefore, 'the !parent company
-had notice.of the formal claim through service of'process on its stibsidiary
company. 2
The amendment to Rule 175(c) has effected changes in the :area 'of
notice to the defendant, as the.amendment requires only that the ,defend-
ant receive reasonable :notice of the :suit. Since 'the :amendment to 15(c).,
the federal courts have been quite 'liberal in -finding that the proper
defendant had notice of fhe plaintiff's 'claim. 'The courts no longer
require that :a defendant receive actual notice through service of process.
Examples of cases so holding are Mitchell v. Hendrickso3 and Kirk 'v.
Cron fich 24
In Mitchell, the U. S. District Court in 'Pennsylvania ruled that the
amended petition related back to the original date ,of filing 'because the
defendant had informal notice of .the suit.25 The jlaintiff named Joseph
Maroney, superintendent of the 'prison, :as ithe defendant -when Joseph
Brierly held the position of superintendent. The prison records office
had 'accepted service of process. furthermore, Brierly 'was represented
by the same attorney who had 'represented all the .other state officials
involved in the case. Therefore, the court 'imputed notice to Brierly
through his attorney. The court thus did not irequire actual notice through
service of process.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appels ,reached -a 'simnilar result .in Kirk.
The original petition improperly ,named 'the 'parish 'and ithe sheriff's
office as defendants. The :amended complaint -named -the sheriff :indi-
vidually and in his official capacity. The plaintiff perfected service of
process upon a deputy sheriff. Although 'the court held that ithe deputy
was an agent for the sheriff, it -noted that the sheriff's 'office, named
'in the original petition, and the sheriff, -named -in the amended petition
were represented by the same attorneys "throughout 'the 'litigation. The
court stated 'that "this court -and others -have :held that :the -requisite
22. See Gifford v. Wichita Falls & Southern Ry., 224 .F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1955),
where the subsidiary was named but 'the .proper agent for 'the parent was served. Such
service would constitute legal -service 'upon the parent. 'See .Howitt .v. longines Wittnauer
Watch Co., 388 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) where the parent was incorrectly named
as the defendant but the person actually served would have -been proper service 'for 'the
subsidiary.
23. 68 F.RD. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
24. 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980).
25. See Williams v. United -States, -405 F.2d :234 (5th -Cir. 1968), where fair :notice
was sufficient; and Talifero v. Costello, 467 F. Supp. 33,(E.D. :Pa. 1979) where constructive
notice was sufficient.
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notice of an action can be imputed to a new defendant through his
attorney who also represented the party or parties originally sued." '2 6
Thus, the federal courts do not require that a defendant receive actual
notice of the claim through service of process but are willing to find
informal notice and imputed notice to be sufficient.
Another aspect of notice which the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c)
added. to the federal cases is that the defendant must receive notice
"within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him." The question of what is meant by "within the period provided
by law" was addressed by the U. S. District Court of Delaware in
Martz v.- Miller Brothers Co. 27 The plaintiff named Miller Brothers
Company in the petition instead of the proper party, Miller Brothers
Company of Newark. These were two separate corporations who, with
the exception of the secretary, had. the same officers. The plaintiff served
the secretary of Miller Brothers instead of the secretary of Miller Brothers
of Newark, and the 'court refused to find that such service was valid
as to Miller Brothers of Newark. However, the court stated that even
if the secretary for Miller Brothers were found to be an agent of Miller
Brothers of Newark, this company had no notice of plaintiff's suit until
three days after the statute of limitations had expired. The Martz court
interpreted "within the period provided by law" restrictively, requiring
that the proposed defendant receive notice through service of process
within the limitations period.
The provision was also interpreted. by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ingrain v. Kumar.28 The plaintiff brought a medical mal-
practice suit naming as the defendant a Dr. Vijaya N. Kumar. After
the statute of limitations had expired, he amended his complaint to
name the proper defendant, a different doctor with the similar name
of Vijay S. Kumar. The court held that "the period within which 'the
party to be: brought in' must. receive notice of the action includes the
reasonable time allowed under the federal rules for service of process. "29
The Ingram court allowed the amended petition to relate back where
the- plaintiff served. the proper defendant four months after prescription
had run because the defendant received the same notice that he would
have received if he had been named properly. Thus, the federal courts
determine "the period provided: by law" by examining the service of
process requirements of a jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction requires that
service of process be effected before the statute. of limitations has expired,
the proper defendant must be served during the prescriptive period; if
service is not effected before that time, the: amended, complaint will not
relate back.30
26. 629 F.2d at. 408.
27. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del 1965).
28. 585 F.2d 566 (2d" Cir. 1978), cert.. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
29. Id. at 571-72.
30. See Archuletta v. Duffy's, Inc., 471 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Fenton,
480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973).
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In Ray v. Alexandria Mall" the Louisiana Supreme Court attempts
to correct two problems which the court perceives in Louisiana's relation
back cases. First, the court adopted
criteria for determing whether art. 1153 allows an amendment
which changes the identity of the party or parties sued to relate
back to the date of filing of the original petition:
(1) The amended claim must arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence set forth in the original pleading;
(2) The purported substitute defendant must have received notice
of the institution of the action such that he will not be prejudiced
in maintaining a defense on the merits;
(3) The purported substitute defendant must know or should
have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of
the proper party defendant, the action would have been brought
against him;
(4) The purported substitute defendant must not be a wholly
new or unrelated defendant, since this would be tantamount to
assertion of a new cause of action which would have otherwise
prescribed .32
Second, the supreme court noted the language in Majesty v. Comet-
Mercury-Ford Co. 33 that "an amending petition to correct a misnomer
does not relate back to the filing of the original petition ' 3 4 and held
that "to the extent that Majesty and its progeny hold inconsistently
with the views expressed herein, they are overruled." 35
The supreme court adopted the objective criteria probably for the
same reason that the comparable language was added to Federal Rule
15(c)-to provide the Louisiana courts with guidance in determing when
an amended complaint should relate back to the original filing date.
However, the court adopted the criteria after noting that "review of
the federal jurisprudence has uncovered several cases which are strikingly
similar to the instant case, particularly Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo."36
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Taormina eight years before
Rule 15(c) was amended; therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court could
have decided Ray by merely applying the objective standard articulated
in Taormina Corp., that the plaintiff made a mistake as to the name
but sued and served the intended entity. Language to this effect is
31. 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
32. Id. at 1086-87.
33. 296 So. 2d 271 (La. 1974), rev'd, Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083 (La.
1983).
34. Id. at 273.
35. 434 So. 2d at 1088.
36. Id. at 1086.
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contained in the opinion. The court recognized that "the defendants'
operating officer, mall manager Ann Shapiro, had been served with a
copy of the petition"13 7 and that "it is obvious that the plaintiff merely
made a mistake as to the proper name of the defendant and that service
was ultimately made upon the proper party defendant. No persuasive
argument can be made that the plaintiff actually intended to sue someone
else." 38 Ray is a misnomer case because the plaintiff actually sued and
served the correct party, the party she intended to sue, but mistakenly
used the wrong name of the defendant. The supreme court went farther
than was necessary by adopting this comparable Rule 15(c) criteria,
given this fact situation. The court could have held that the amended
petition related back to the original filing because the partnership had
notice of the suit through service of process on its agent. As mall
manager, Ann Shapiro was an agent for the partnership, the Alexandria
Mall Company.
Nevertheless, the court was correct to eliminate the erroneous lan-
guage in Majesty that "an amending petition to correct a misnomer
does not relate back to the filing of the original petition." 3 9 A misnomer
case is a case in which an amending petition should relate back because
the defendant has received notice of the plaintiff's claim through service
of process. Thus, the Ray court did not need to overrule Majesty to
eliminate the language because Majesty is not a misnomer case. In
Majesty the plaintiff did not serve the defendant's agent appointed for
service of process; thus, prescription was not interrupted because the
defendant did not receive the required notice. In the amended petition,
the plaintiff attempted to add a new party who had not been served
with process. The supreme court could have reversed the Ray court of
appeal decision that Majesty required dismissal of the plaintiff's suit by
distinguishing, rather than overruling, Majesty.
There are two differences between the criteria adopted in Ray and
the criteria adopted in Rule 15(c). First, the Louisiana criteria does not
include the language "within the period provided by law"; thus, in Loui-
siana, service of process after the one year prescriptive period has expired
should continue to be valid. Second, the Louisiana Supreme Court in-
cludes a fourth criteria not found in amended Rule 15(c): the purported
substitute defendant must not be a wholly new or unrelated defendant,
since this would be tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action
which would have otherwise prescribed. This means that it must be clear
who the plaintiff intended to sue. For example, if the plaintiff intends
to sue defendant A and names and serves A, an amended petition naming
B as defendant will not relate back even if B has notice of the suit because
the plaintiff is attempting to add a wholly new and unrelated defendant.
37. Id. at 1087.
38. Id.
39. 296 So. 2d at 273.
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The plaintiff intended to sue A, and B is a wholly different defendant.
The objective criteria adopted by' the Ray court should not have im--
plications for cases that are factually similar to Ray where process is served
on an agent. Federal cases decided prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule
15(c) recognized that service on the defendant's agent is sufficient notice
to the defendant of the suit. Also, service in the domicile cases will not
be affected, as Louisiana courts have always allowed the petition- to relate
back where service is effected. at the domicile.
The Ray decision will have implications in those cases where, although
neither the agent nor the domicile is served, service is such that the.
proper party had reasonable notice. Actual notice by service of process
will not be required; instead, fair notice, informal notice, and construc'-
tive notice will be sufficient to allow the amended petition to relate
back. Majesty would be decided differently today if the plaintiff could
show that the right defendant received notice such that he is not prej -
udiced' in maintaining a defense and. that he knew that but for a mistake
concerning identity, the action would have been brought against him.
In Majesty the proper defendant. answered the plaintiff's original suit,
therefore, the plaintiff could argue that the defendant had notice that
he was the intended party. Also, the effect of Ray will be to expand
Wiltz and Manemin in an Ingram' v. Kumar factual situation. The
amended complaint will relate back even though the petition is not
served on the correct domicile of the. proper defendant, if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the defendant received actual notice of the suit.
The plaintiff is not required to serve process on the defendant to interrupt
prescription,, but prescription is interrrupted if the defendant received
the same notice that he would have received had he been named properly..
Given the facts presented in Ray, the Louisiana Supreme Court went
farther than was necessary by adopting the objective criteria. Although
the court could have arrived at the same result using other cases, the
opinion will have important effects on the application of article 1153.
The court has successfully eliminated the erroneous "misnomer lan-
guage" of the Majesty opinion, adopted clear criteria that are easy to
apply, and provided. protection to the Louisiana plaintiff with the liberal
notice standard. that is embodied in Rule 15(c). Adopting this criteria,
Lousiana courts have moved, away from requiring formal notice through
service of process to requiring only actual notice about the time that
the defendant would have received notice. Also, in adopting criteria (4),.
the court is attempting to distinquish the misidentification case from
the situation where the plaintiff is joining a new defendant. Such a
distinction is fair because in the latter situation a new cause of action
is asserted.
Julie R. Wilkerson
[Vol. 46
